Summits

Starred review from September 24, 2007
John F. Kennedy opined that nations in conflict would do better to “meet at the summit than at the brink.” Reynolds had the intriguing idea of examining the conflicts of the 20th century through the lens of its pivotal summit meetings. Given his Cambridge professorship and eight books on WWII and the Cold War (Command of History
), the author's thorough mastery of his subject is reflected in the fluency and assurance of the writing. As he explains, many summits have been vitiated by misplaced trust: at Munich in 1938, Chamberlain believed Hitler would keep his word on Czechoslovakia. In Reynolds's view, Kennedy and Khrushchev failed at Vienna in 1961 in nearly all respects, and their failure had consequences, including Khrushchev's belligerence—and ultimate humiliation—in the Cuban missile crisis. In 1985, Reagan and Gorbachev held what the author believes was the most successful summit of all, a result of careful preparation and the old-fashioned, behind-the-scenes diplomacy of George Shultz. The Camp David summit with Sadat, Carter and Begin, in this account, rivals Munich for sheer drama. The stories of these summits (plus the post-WWII Yalta conference and Nixon/Brezhnev in 1972) reveal the calculation, bluff, mutual incomprehension and good intentions that make meetings at the top risky and, occasionally, productive.

January 15, 2008
Reynolds (international history, Cambridge Univ.) chooses to use the summits between world leaders as hooks for his take on 20th-century history. He is treading the same ground covered in Jonathan Fenby's recent "Alliance: The Inside Story of How Roosevelt, Stalin & Churchill Won One War & Began Another." Reynolds's angle is to concentrate on the essential facets of summitry: the face-to-face meeting and the give-and-take among world leaders. He examines at great length the summits that took place during World War II among Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt. Other summits he covers are among Henry IV, the Holy Roman Emperor, and Pope Gregory VII; between Kennedy and Khrushchev; and between George W. Bush and Tony Blair. He provides detailed information, drawing in part from newly opened Soviet archives, to give readers historical context, explaining the events surrounding each summit and the dynamics of each conference. A fascinating look at historical events through this particular lens, his book is recommended for academic and public libraries.Harry Willems, Park City P.L., KS

Copyright 2008 Library Journal, LLC Used with permission.

November 1, 2007
Examining fateful international conferences, historian Reynolds extracts diplomatic lessons from their conduct and their consequences. Regarding two as failures (Chamberlain-Hitler in 1938; Kennedy-Khrushchev in 1961), three as successes (Yalta in 1945; Sadat-Begin-Carter in 1978; Reagan-Gorbachev in 1985), and Nixon-Brezhnev in 1972 as a success that failed, Reynolds renders a three-part analysis of each tte--tte. Within a preparation-negotiation-implementation structure, Reynolds narrates the personal dramas between leaders who see themselves as history makers, an exalted self-regard with substance andseen in light of Reynolds adducing of mental alertness, comprehension of details, and negotiating abilitygrave risk. Chamberlain proved a terrible tactician, conceding his bottom line (cession of Sudetenland) within minutes of sitting down with Hitler. Canny negotiators who held back their final offer earn Reynolds better marks for lone-ranger diplomacy. Bargaining skills aside, Reynolds also assesses leaders personal relationships, which preoccupy the media and the public and can affect the balance of war and peace. With general-interest readability and acuity about diplomatic practice, Reynolds ably gathers two distinct audiences.(Reprinted with permission of Booklist, copyright 2007, American Library Association.)